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Statement of Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the appellate court by virtue of the provisions 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Statement of Issues Presented for Review 
A. The trial court improperly interpreted the lease provision requiring 
defendant o provide an HVAC system in "working condition." 
B. The trial court failed to credit Plaintiff for cost of repairs to the HVAC 
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which were undertaken by Plaintiff but were the responsibility of defendant. 
C. The trial court failed to properly allocate common area maintenance fees. 
D. The standard of review is "clearly erroneous." Dayton-Hudson v. Macerich 
Real Estate, 751 F. 2d 219 (8th Cir. 1984). 
Constitutional Issues 
There are no constitutional issues for review 
Statement of the Case 
This is a declaratory judgment action which was heard without jury to Judge 
Timothy A. Hanson of the Third District Court. Judge Hanson ruled against Plaintiff 
and in favor of Defendant, and awarded monetary damages to Defendant on its 
counterclaim. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On December 28, 1993, Appellant signed a shopping center lease for the 
use of 17,600 square feet of space at the Meadowbrook Shopping Center located at 
4151 South Redwood Road in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and paid a security 
deposit of $7,333.33 (lease, §3.1) 
2. The term of the lease was for five years commencing April 1, 1994 and rent 
was to be paid at an increasing rate over time so that the rental rate doubled from the 
first year to the fifth year (lease, §1.1 and §2.1) 
3. Appellant was also to pay "a proportional amount of the costs incurred by 
Landlord" (lease, §2.2.2) in supervising and administering the common areas of the 
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shopping center; to pay all utilities and other costs of operating the common areas; and 
to maintain and repair the common areas. 
4. According to the lease, §2.2.2, common areas are parking lots, sidewalks and 
landscaped areas of the shopping center. 
5. According to the lease, §2.2.2, proportional amount of charges attributable 
to a tenant is the ratio of the tenant's share of the total leased space to the common 
areas. 
6. Article 23.1 of the lease states in pertinent part the following: 
23.1 Landlord to provide Premises in "As Is" condition, except that the 
HVAC [Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning] must be in working 
condition. Landlord to warranty HVAC for sixty (60) days. 
7. Robert C. Kropf, an officer of The Dinner and Bingo Club, testified as 
follows concerning the condition of the HVAC: 
Q. Was the heating, air conditioning, HVAC ever in working condition, 
in your opinion? 
A. No. 
Q. When you first entered, took possession of the premises, opened 
business in April of 1994, how did the heating and air conditioning 
work? 
A. Uhm, the north side unit was not working 
(Transcript [T], p 91, lines 13-21) 
Q. And you say when you first started work there, first opened business, 
the north side heating unit and the air conditioner unit didn't work? 
A. I am not sure about the air conditioner, but the heater did not work. 
Q. Was it fixed? 
A. Not until the following year, or the fall of '94. 
Q. Did it work then? 
A. No. 
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Q. Why didn't it work? 
A. I mean, we had heat sometimes. We never had control. We couldn't 
control the temperature from the thermostats. And we still have that 
problem.(emphasis added) 
(T,p 92-93, lines 5-16; 25, 1-5) 
Q. Tell me, would you set the thermostat at 72 degrees? 
A. 72 to 75 
Q. And what would happen when it got that temperature? 
A. It kicked the air conditioning on. 
Q. And would the heating unit go off? 
A. The heating unit would go off and the air conditioner would kick on. 
When it dropped down the heater would kick on. 
Q. So they alternated back and forth? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ask Mike at A-Advanced to fix that? 
A. Yeah, several times. I mean, he come out and tinkered on them 
constantly 
Q. Okay. And was it ever fixed? 
A. No. By the time we had a problem with that it seemed like we 
worked on it constantly. And then someone would come out and he'd 
work on the compressors, air conditioning of the unit. It is a constant 
back and forth of one or the other. 
(T., page 93-94, lines 6-25, 1-2) 
Q. Let's talk about the spring of 1995. 
A. Okay. 
Q. And during that winter had the heating unit ever worked properly so 
there was constant heat inside the premises? 
A. No. 
The Court: I don't understand. No, to the question or no, it didn't work? 
A. It just-the temperature to regulate it, to keep it at an adequate 
temperature we'd have to manually shut the heaters off. You know, 
instead of being on an auto, when it got to a temperature it kicks off, 
we'd have to shut 'em off when it got to the temperature, otherwise, the 
air conditioner would kick on. 
(T., p 94, lines 3-17) 
8. Without quoting all of Mr. Kropf s testimony, he continued to state that in 
the spring of 1995, the south side unit compressor was knocking (T, p 95, lines 7-9); 
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that they would have to go to the roof to press a button three or four times a day (T, p 
95, lines 14-19); and that when they first spoke with the defendant landlord, the 
landlord was going to install new units (T, p 96, line 5)1 
9. In June of 1995, Plaintiff had another air conditioning company undertake 
major repairs on the units, which then functioned for approximately 30 days and then 
failed again (T, p 99). The air conditioning units were never able to keep the premises 
at a constant temperature through the summer of 1995 after the major repairs, causing 
Plaintiff to receive complaints daily from customers. (T, p 100). 
10. The air conditioning units were never in working condition through the 
summer of 1995, and through the date of the trial. (T, p 101; p 148, lines 10-21; p 194, 
lines 1-25). 
11. Defendant's witnesses testified that a HVAC unit was good for ten to 
fifteen years (T, p 15, lines 8-12) and that the units on the premises were so old that 
parts were no longer made for the units and that they were approximately twenty-five 
years old. (T, p 83, lines 1-16) 
11. And in spite of the substantial work undertaken on the HVAC, the heating 
units did not work either, having the same problem that the air conditioners had during 
the entire period of the lease. 
*In light of defendant's objection to the introduction of the last statement 
regarding installation of new units, the court admitted the statement to show the 
intention of the parties only, and not to indicate an interpretation of the lease or rights 
under the lease 
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12. Defendant did present testimony of their repairman that he left the HVAC 
units in working condition in April, 1994 (T, p 75, lines 19-22), May of 1994 (T, p 76, 
lines 16-19) and in October of 1994, (T, p 78, lines 19-23). Interestingly, throughout 
the entire period that the units were supposedly working, Defendant paid over $8,000 
in repair bills for working on the units no less than a dozen times. (T, p 86, lines 2-6). 
13. The assessment of Defendant's witness that the units work is belied by the 
fact that Plaintiff substantially testified that the units never (but for 30 days in June of 
1995) worked in any acceptable manner from the date of occupancy until the date of 
the trial in December of 1996. 
14. Plaintiffs witnesses also testified at length concerning their repeated 
complaints to Defendant regarding the failure of the HVAC units (T, p 33, lines 4-16; 
T, p 38, lines 15-20, and further testified of Defendant's repeated acknowledgment of 
the problem. In fact, Defendant tired so of the complaints that all complaints were 
referred directly to the repair company. (T, p 193, lines 6-9). 
15. Plaintiff s witnesses stated that bids were discussed concerning the 
replacement of the HVAC (T, p 40, lines 10-13) but Defendant's witness stated that 
they received no proposals to replace the HVAC (T, p 53, lines 16-22). 
Summary of Arguments 
1. It is the landlord's duty to repair and replace fixtures and structures on the 
demised premises which require a substantial investment of funds. 
2. The landlord failed to equitably allocate common area maintenance fees to 
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Plaintiff. 
3. The court improperly assessed attorney's fees to Plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
1 DUTY OF LANDLORD TO REPAIR 
Dinner and Bingo argues that the HVAC is a fixture to the building which is 
then the duty and responsibility of the landlord to repair and maintain. Throughout the 
trial, evidence was presented that the landlord agreed to participate in paying for the 
replacement HVAC, but in reality, the landlord's obligation is not to merely 
participate, but to assume complete responsibility for maintaining its fixtures, just as it 
is fully responsible for repairing the plumbing, lighting and other similar fixtures. The 
following case law supports this contention: 
1. Anchor Inn v. Knopman. 246 NW.2d 416 Michigan. 1976^ Plaintiff lessee 
restaurant sued defendant to recover cost of replacing an air conditioning unit. The 
lease provision stated that the Landlord was responsible for maintaining the HVAC, so 
Landlord worked on units, but could not get it working properly. Manager of 
restaurant called Landlord many times to have the units repaired, but the restaurant 
finally had to get its own repairmen who said that the unit could not be repaired, but 
had to be replaced. The restaurant replaced the air conditioning and sought 
reimbursement. The court stated: 
Where the landlord has covenanted to make repairs and fails to do so, the 
8 
tenant, after giving reasonable notice to the landlord, may make the 
repairs and recover the cost of such repairs from the landlord or he may 
deduct the cost from the rent. See, C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant, §369, p 
972; §840, p 807, BorochoffProperties v. Creative Printing, 210 S.E.2d 
809 (Georgia, 1974). The landlord's duty to maintain in good repair an 
air conditioning unit on the leased premises extends to reimbursing the 
tenant for monies expended in replacing defective air conditioning 
apparatus. Swern v. Momsville, 239 A.2d 302 (Perm, 1968). 
In the case, the court found the HVAC was outmoded at the time the premises 
were leased, and that the HVAC could not cool the premises sufficient for use as a 
large restaurant. The Landlord was required to pay for the cost of replacing the 
HVAC unit. 
2. Kosena v. Eck. 635 p.2d 1287 (Montana, 1981) 
Plaintiff was the successor tenant to a commercial lease with the landlord 
defendant. A fire destroyed the premises, and the defendant restored the building. 
The parties orally agreed on rent at the rate of $650 per month, but three months after 
moving into the restored building, the defendants attempted to raise the rent to $1175 
per month. 
"Absent an agreement to the contrary, the common law rule is that the 
lessor has no duty to repair [Solich v. Hale, 435 P.2d 883 (Montana, 
1967)] Here there is an agreement to repair contained in the lease 
agreement, and when the landlords elected to repair and restore the 
premises, they became bound by this agreement to make the repairs 
necessary. . . The landlords failed to do this, and the tenant was 
compelled to complete the work. Under the agreement, the landlords are 
liable for the costs incurred by the tenant in completing the repairs that 
were the landlord's duty to provide." Kosena, supra, at 1293 
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3. Dayton-Hudson v. Macerich. 751 F.2d 219 (8th Circ, 1984) 
Plaintiff leased a building with a two-ply roof from defendant landlord. Before 
and during the tenancy, the roof leaked and landlord would only repair the leaks as 
they occurred. Plaintiff then replaced the entire roof with a four ply roof and sued for 
declaratory judgment to obtain the cost of the roof replacement from defendant. 
The defendant landlord argued that its duty under the lease was to "repair and 
maintain in good order and condition, and that "repair" does not mean "replace." 
The trial court found that at the time that the roof was replaced, the roof had exceeded 
its useful life and could not be maintained other than by a replacement of the roof. 
Utah case law also holds that a landlord is under a duty to repair and to 
maintain premises in habitable condition. In the instant case, Plaintiff testified that 
many customers complained about the heat, or cold, as the case was, and that they did 
lose business because of the irregularity of the heating and cooling. Defendant did not 
counter such argument with any testimony that the premises were adequately heated or 
cooled, thus, with no contrary evidence, the court should find that the premises, at 
least periodically, were uninhabitable. 
4. The Utah Supreme Court case of Wolfe v. White, 225 P.2d 729, 119 Utah 
183 (1950) concerned the replacement of a roof, and whether the landlord or tenant 
was responsible for the cost of such replacement. 
Lessee accepted the premises in an "as is" condition, with the provision in the 
lease that the lessor would "keep" the premises in good condition and repair. Lessor 
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argued that the phrase "keep" the premises in good condition and repair does not mean 
"put" the premises in good condition and repair [similar to the position of the instant 
defendant], and appealed a jury verdict in favor of lessee. In commenting on the 
landlord's duty, the Wolfe court states: 
The premises may be, when leased, so old and dilapidated as to 
uninhabitable and to claim that the owner of the premises may, with 
the knowledge of their condition lease them for the purpose of a 
dwelling house or hotel, for example, with an express covenant on his 
part that he will keep them in repair and yet be under no obligation to 
put the premises in a habitable condition is contrary both to common law 
and to common sense. If the lessor covenants to keep the premises in 
repair, he must put them in such a condition that they shall be 
reasonably fit for the occupation of the tenant. Id. at 731 
The court further comments on the issue of how to determine whether a fixture 
is in "working condition" or "good condition" which appear to be comparative terms: 
'Good condition and repair' is a relative phrase, but it does 
not mean just any condition in which the building may be found. 
Apparently neither party actually knew the condition of the roof at the 
time of the execution of the lease. Later it was discovered to be 
defective. It was out of good condition and repair. Who was to put it 
in? If the parties intended to contract that the landlord would 
'maintain the roof in its present state', it would have been a simple 
matter for them to have so indicated. The lease was drawn by the 
landlord, and is to be construed most strongly against him where a 
question of conflicting meaning arises. Id. at 731-732 
The Landlord does have a duty to repair those items of the demised premises 
which are permanent and incapable of being removed or altered without significant 
effort and structural change. See, Randolph, The Commercial Property Lease 165 
(1993) and Fresh Cut. Inc. v. Bert Fazli. 650 N.E. 2d 1126 (1995V In this case, the 
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HVAC units were structurally attached to the building and were part and parcel of the 
structure of the building. As such, defendant was obligated to maintain, repair, and if 
necessaiy, as it was in this case, to replace the HVAC units at its cost without any 
burden to Plaintiff. See, Paul Mueller Company v. Cache Valley Dairy. 657 P.2d 1279 
(Utah, 1982). 
II. ALLOCATION OF COMMON AREA MAINTENANCE FEES. 
Each tenant of the strip mall where the subject premises are located is required 
to pay a proportionate share of the expenses of operating the mall such as maintenance 
and repair of the parking lot, utility payments for electric lighting, landscaping and 
similar events. The specific language from the lease defines common area 
maintenance (CAM) fees as follows: 
2.2.2 A proportional amount (as defined below) of the costs incurred by 
Landlord to (I) supervise and administer the common areas . . . (ii) pay all 
utilities and other costs, taxes, levies and expenses of operating the common 
area of the Shopping Center, general signs and the like; and (iii) maintain and 
repair all such common areas. . . . shall include a fee to Landlord for 
supervision . . . equal to 5% of Tenant's minimum rent. 
The "proportional amount" of such charges attributable to Tenant is the 
percent derived from dividing the square footage leased by Tenant hereunder by 
the total leasable square footage of the Shopping Center. 
As stated at the trial, Plaintiff was consistently billed for CAM fees at the 
annual rate of $1.50 per square foot of leased space. In such case, Plaintiff paid the 
amount of $2,179.65 per month, or $26,156.00 per year for 17.48% of the total 
premises. Yet all of the documents produced by defendant indicated that the CAM 
fees, along with taxes and insurance, for the entire time that Plaintiff was present in 
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1994 total but $74,450 of which the Plaintiffs share of 17.48% is only $13,013.86. 
When the management fee of 5% of base rent is added, the total due for 1994 is 
$14,480.53, and Plaintiff overpaid its 1994 CAM expenses by $2,951.47. 
In 1995, Plaintiff paid $26,156.00 in CAM fees, yet the total CAM fees for the 
shopping center were $29,613; property taxes were $55,649; and insurance was 
$29,741 for a total of $115,003 of which Plaintiffs 17.48% portion was $20,102.52 
plus a management fee of $2,800.60 for total expense of $22,903.12. Thus, in 1995, 
Plaintiff overpaid by $3,252.88. 
In 1996, Plaintiff only made three CAM payments totaling $6,537. When all 
the calculations were made, Plaintiff owed Defendant but $1,915.65. Thus, Defendant 
owes Plaintiff $4,188.70 for overpaid CAM fees. 
Ill DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff submits that the Court should declare that the lease requires Defendant 
to maintain and replace, if necessary, the HVAC units on the premises so that Plaintiff 
is supplied with sufficient heating and cooling during the appropriate seasons of the 
year. 
IV. UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
The testimony elicited indicates that Plaintiff expended considerable sums in 
repairing the HVAC units after October of 1994 when defendant decided that it would 
not expend additional funds in repairing the HVAC. Under the principle of quantum 
meruit, defendant received the benefit of such expenditures and should be required to 
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repay Plaintiff for such. See, Paschalls. Inc. v. Dozier. 407 S.W. 2d 150 (1966); 
Restatement of Restitution. §§113-117. 
SUMMARY 
The trial court erred in requiring Plaintiff to pay for the replacement and repair 
of the HVAC when the HVAC was still under warranty and the HVAC was a fixture 
which requires repair and replacement by the landlord. If the HVAC had been 
repaired to the extent that it operated satisfactorily as an air conditioning and heating 
unit should, that is, without the necessity of climbing up and down to the roof each 
time the air conditioning needed to be turned on or off, then Plaintiff would have no 
claim. But never did the HVAC work in any satisfactory manner, and the 
preponderance of the evidence strongly states that defendant did not fulfill its 
obligations to provide a warm, or cool, as the case may be, environment for the patrons 
of Plaintiff 
Defendant also overcharged for the CAM fees, and but for the instant lawsuit, it 
would have continued overcharging Plaintiff for yearly CAM fees as it did in 1994 and 
1995. In 1996, Plaintiff only paid three out of twelve months of CAM fees, but 
because of the gross overcharges of defendant, Plaintiff owed less than a month of 
standard CAM fee charges. One wonders how much money Defendant has 
overcharged the other tenants of the shopping center. 
The judgment should be reversed and remanded to the trial court with the 
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necessity of climbing up and down to the roof each time the air conditioning needed to be 
turned on or off, then Plaintiff would have no claim. But never did the HVAC work in any 
satisfactory manner, and the preponderance of the evidence strongly states that defendant did 
not fulfill its obligations to provide a warm, or cool, as the case may be, environment for the 
patrons of Plaintiff. 
Defendant also overcharged for the CAM fees, and but for the instant lawsuit, it would 
have continued overcharging Plaintiff for yearly CAM fees as it did in 1994 and 1995. In 
1996, Plaintiff only paid three out of twelve months of CAM fees, but because of the gross 
overcharges of defendant, Plaintiff owed less than a month of standard CAM fee charges. One 
wonders how much money Defendant has overcharged the other tenants of the shopping 
center. 
The judgment should be reversed and remanded to the trial court with the instruction 
that Plaintiff is not liable for the cost of replacing or repairing the HVAC; that Plaintiff should 
be paid its overcharges; and that Plaintiff should be granted its reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred in prosecuting this action. 
A el cil. c1": iii idum 
There are no materials for the addendum. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of August, 1998. 
DEAN H. BECKER 
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